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TRADE CREDIT INSURANCE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEM 
 
Abstract 
The presence of different risk factors in international trade gives evidence of the necessity of 
support in gaps that may affect exporters’ activity. To maximize the trade volumes and in the same 
time to minimize the exporters’ risks the stakeholders use trade credit insurance. The paper provides 
analysis of conceptual background of the trade credit insurance in the world. We analyzed briefly the 
problems, arising in insurance markets due to asymmetric information, such as adverse selection and 
moral hazard. Also we discuss the main stages of development of trade credit insurance in countries 
worldwide. Using comparative and graphical analysis we provide a brief evaluation of the dynamics 
of claims and recoveries for different forms of trade credit insurance. We found that the claims related 
to the commercial risk for medium and long trade credits in recent years exceed the recoveries, while 
with the political risk the reverse trend holds. And we originally consider these findings in terms of 
information asymmetry in the trade credit insurance differentiated by type of risk.   
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I. Introduction 
At the current stage of development of international trade the indirect promotion of 
cross-border trade in goods and services becomes increasingly important. More than three 
quarters of all transactions are accomplished with credit instruments. International practice 
includes different tools for supporting the participants of trade. Since the protection is 
perceived as the main reason to use appropriate instruments, the widespread instrument is 
the financial support in the form of trade credit insurance in order to cover risks, occurred 
during transactions. The presence of different risk factors in international trade gives 
evidence of the necessity of support in gaps that may affect exporters’ activity. 
In order to maximize the trade volumes and in the same time to minimize the 
exporters’ risks the stakeholders use trade credit insurance, which could be regarded as an 
important tool to manage the risk of delaying payments or a failure to pay.  
Since in transition economies this instrument of facilitating international trade is not a 
frequent practice, in order to elaborate some practical guidelines aimed at improving the 
financial support of exporters it is expedient to consider some conceptual issues of trade 
credit insurance as the widespread instrument of mitigating risks in international trade.  
So, the purpose of the paper is to provide analysis of conceptual background of the 
trade credit insurance in the world. It will also focus on brief analysis of the dynamics of 
claims and recoveries for both short-term and long and medium term trade credit insurance. 
To do this we structured the paper as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical and empirical 
research on the insurance markets and trade credit insurance. Section 3 provides brief 
theoretical background of trade credit insurance, its history, benefits and disadvantages and 
examines briefly the problems in insurance markets occurred due to asymmetric 
information. Section 4 analyzes the dynamics of claims and recoveries for both short-term 
and long/medium term trade credit insurance in the world. Finally, Section 5 presents some 
concluding remarks. 
II. Literature review 
Some part of existing research studies the theoretical aspects of trade credit insurance 
in the globalized world, and the problems of insurance markets such as adverse selection 
and moral hazard. 
In their famous work “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the 
Economics of Imperfect Information”, Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) examined incomplete 
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competitive markets with imperfect information, focusing on the insurance market. They 
developed a model which showed that existing market equilibrium consists of contracts 
which specified both prices and quantities. 
Dewit (1996a) examined incomplete insurance markets with adverse selection and 
trade opportunities. She argued that subsidizing a public insurance system could be regarded 
as the second-best policy aimed to remove inefficiencies on incomplete markers. Moreover, 
such policy could lead to a trade creation.  
In her another work “Export Insurance Subsidization: Risk Coverage, Strategic Export 
Promotion or Aid?” (Dewit (1996b)) she investigated government export insurance 
subsidization as a way of strategic export promotion. Notably she investigated the provision 
of export insurance under asymmetric information in the insurance market with oligopolistic 
behavior. The author concluded that when only constrained coverage contracts are offered 
and there are information asymmetries, the simple state intervention rule is no longer 
effective.  
Gianturco (2001) investigated the role of export credit agencies (ECAs) and their 
financial impact on international trade, notably by examining their history and functions and 
making conclusions about their contribution to national development and economic growth. 
Baker (2003) examined the U.S. system of international trade finance including the main 
financial and credit institution such as the U.S. Export-Import Bank, the Foreign Credit 
Insurance Association, the Public Export Funding Corporation which insure trade credits 
and facilitate country’s trade. Riestra (2003) examined the development of credit insurance 
in European countries in order to determine its possibilities and constraints, notably for 
small- and medium-sized companies. Gomez (2004) compared both American and Brazilian 
models of export credit insurance. As a result, he found some similarities in the policy-
making and regulatory boards and certain differences concerning the operational agents. 
Ascari (2007) examined main factors of changing the export credit insurance business 
model. He found that actual strategies of export insurance companies diverge from 
traditional models in order to become a global financial player in the international markets. 
Einav & Finkelstein (2011) analyzed both theoretical and empirical work on adverse 
selection in insurance markets, notably its implications for allocation of insurance, social 
welfare, and public policy. Cuñat & Appendini (2012) studied the trade credit and its role in 
financing of small and medium businesses, taking into account the problems of transactions 
costs, imperfect competition, incomplete markets, adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Van der Veer (2015a) studied the impact of claims on the both availability and price of 
export credit insurance. The obtained results allowed him to conclude that the global trade 
credit insurer could shift extreme loss shocks across countries worldwide by temporarily 
reducing its export credit insurance supply. Yalcin (2015) examined an impact of bilateral 
investment treaties and their insurance as a tool of protection of foreign investors. 
Empirical research estimating the impact of trade credit insurance on trade flows and 
economic growth is generally provided for selected industries, countries and regions, where 
such influence could be perceived as significant. 
Panagaria (2000) investigating the case for export subsidies argued that in most 
practical situations the removal of tariffs (free trade) could be regarded as a superior policy. 
Also he investigated the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection, by concluding that 
this is not a reliable reason for government intervention. The study of practical experience of 
India, Brazil and Mexico allowed him to conclude that in India export subsidies have little 
impact on exports while in Brazil and Mexico export subsidies were a wasteful tool to 
promote export diversification.  
Olivella & Vera-Hernández (2008) tested the hypothesis of adverse selection on 
private health insurance markets. Notably, they supposed the correlation between risk and 
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the probability of taking private insurance under adverse selection and symmetric 
information. And they found evidence of adverse selection in the British private health 
insurance market. Sandström (2008) examined the relationship between political risk and 
international debt defaults. In order to test hypothesis that country-specific political risk 
factors cause constraints for debt repayment, both when the export credit is extended to 
public institutions or to corporations, she used data of export credit guaranteed debt 
contracts of Finnish exporters and foreign counterparts in 145 countries worldwide.  
Shi et al. (2012) studied adverse selection in insurance markets with information 
asymmetry where beneficiaries differ in the degree of risk aversion and riskiness. They 
tested empirically their theoretical model using observations from major Singapore’s 
automobile insurer. The regression model allowed them to conclude about evidence of 
asymmetric information in this market.  
Auboin & Engemann (2014) examined the impact of trade credit on trade on a macro 
level. They used data on trade credits for the period from 2005 to 2011. Using econometric 
techniques they identified positive impact of insured trade credit on trade. Furthermore 
authors found that this impact is very strong and stable over the whole cycle, remaining 
steady both at crisis and non-crisis stages. Manova & Yu (2014) investigated the impact of 
financial frictions on China companies’ choice between ordinary trade and processing, and 
also how could such decision affect firm’s performance. They found that such credit 
constraints could induce economic agents to conduct more processing trade and could 
prevent them from developing higher value-added activities. 
Sözen et al. (2014) analyzed the problem of possible adverse selection on the export 
credit market in Turkey. They developed credit risk model for 1114 SMEs that take direct 
credits from Türk Eximbank within the period from 2003 to 2008. As a result they found 
that some specific sectors were oversupported by the Bank directly, that allow them to 
conclude about information asymmetry and adverse selection problem on the export credit 
market. Van der Veer (2015b) using econometric techniques examined a relationship 
between private export credit insurance and trade. He used panel data, notably, the value of 
exports insured, of world’s leading private trade credit insurers from 25 exporting countries 
to 183 destination ones for the period of 1992 to 2006. As a result he found that that private 
export credit insurance affects trade (trade multiplier) to a greater extent than the value of 
exports insured. Kerer et al. (2016) studied the credit insurance in African countries, namely 
Morocco, Ghana, Uganda and Madagascar in the framework of intention of German 
government to increase its engagement in agricultural finance in Africa. 
III. Theoretical background 
The experts of the World Bank determine trade credit insurance as an “insurance 
policy and risk management product that covers the payment risk resulting from the delivery 
of goods or services” (Jones, 2010, p. 3). Trade credit insurance aims to protect the accounts 
receivable of economic agents from losses occurred as a consequence of non-payments of 
their debtors. Also it could cover losses resulting from such risks as war and civil 
disturbance, nationalization, expropriation etc. 
Since the premiums are generally charged monthly, they are calculated either as the 
percentage of sales of given month or as a percentage of receivables outstanding. It should 
be noted that this type of insurance insure only the risk of firms, not of individuals and the 
premium rate reflects the average credit risk of the insured portfolio. The trade credit 
insurance could also cover single large transactions.  
According to A Guide to Credit Insurance (2015) issued by Euler Hermes, the largest 
provider of trade credit insurance in the world, trade credit insurance “is a business 
insurance product that protects a seller against losses from nonpayment of a commercial 
trade debt” (A Guide to Credit Insurance, 2015, p. 2). 
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The short-term trade credit insurance usually covers trade transactions having terms of 
repayment of one year or less. Medium- and long-term trade credit insurance includes 
insurance for transactions for more than one year (generally, from 3 to 5 years) (Auboin, 
2014, p. 5).  
A standard trade credit insurance policy cover all receivables, while specific account 
insurance could apply to certain group of customers or to selected transactions. But such 
policy typically does not include the trade between affiliates of MNC, the trade between 
government departments and agencies. Also at present day the activity of trade credit insurer 
is accompanied by credit management services and excess loss cover, when insurer covers 
the risk of exceptional default payments (Riestra, 2003, pp. 2-3). 
According to Euler Hermes (2015) estimations, the trade receivables could represent 
from 30% to 40% of a supplier’s balance sheet. This means that economic agents face risks 
of financial difficulties occurred due to the buyer late or non-payment. Notably, 25% 
insolvencies of suppliers in the European Union are occurred due to these reasons (Euler 
Hermes, 2015, pp. 9-10). 
In insurance markets the widespread is the problem of asymmetric information, since 
certain participants are informed better about situation on the market. The adverse selection 
occurs before the transaction is accomplished when economic agents are more informed 
about their risks, about probability of a loss etc. than the insurers. The situation of moral 
hazard, as a type of information asymmetry, appears after the transaction occurs, when 
insurance companies are not able to observe perfectly the actions of insureds and as a result 
they are dissuaded from providing the protection that would be ensured in a market with 
perfect information. 
The problem of asymmetric information is larger for the developing countries than for 
developed ones for two reasons. First are the difficulties in obtaining the information. 
Second, the instruments designed to protect the counterparties may not be available as 
required (Sokolovska & Sokolovskyi, 2015). Insurance and credit markets and ratings are 
less developed, thereby complicating the acquisition of information in order to prevent an 
adverse selection situation. Also the provision of insurance and credit services is often 
limited by a non-developed legal system, complicating the contract enforcement. That, in 
turn, limits the use of collateral aimed to reduce moral hazard (Fingerand & Schuknecht, 
1999, p. 4). 
Fig. 1. presents the classic case of adverse selection in the insurance market. 
Marginal cost curve has a downward slope. This reflects the adverse selection property 
of insurance markets: individuals who want to pay the most for coverage have the highest 
expected cost. The demand curve reflects the willingness to pay for insurance. 
The risk premium is shown graphically in the figure as the vertical distance between 
the MC curve and the demand curve. The demand curve in theory is always above the 
marginal cost curve, since the risk premium is always positive. This means that the demand 
curve is efficient for all economic agents to be insured (Qeff = Qmax), i.e. the efficient 
allocation is defined by relationship between demand and marginal cost, and that is the 
reason of arising the inefficiency occurred due to adverse selection. At the same time the 
equilibrium allocation could be determined between demand and average cost. In the case of 
adverse selection the average cost curve lies above the marginal cost curve and intersects the 
demand curve at a point less than Qmax. As a result the equilibrium quantity will be less the 
efficient one (Qmax) and the equilibrium price (Peq) will be less than efficient price – the 
situation of under-insurance. 
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Notes: D – demand curve; MC – marginal cost curve; AC – average cost curve 
Source: (Einav & Finkelstein, 2011) 
Fig. no. 1. Adverse selection in the insurance market 
 
In such case the cost of welfare will depend on the lost surplus (the risk premium), of 
economic agents who will remain inefficiently uninsured in the competitive equilibrium, i.e. 
whose willingness to pay does not exceed the equilibrium price, Peq. As a result, the total 
welfare loss from adverse selection in this example can be determined by the area of the 
deadweight loss trapezium EFGH (Einav & Finkelstein, 2011, pp. 116-119). 
The insurance theory generally determines two main types of insured risks in 
international trade: commercial risk and political risk.  
Commercial risk is the risk of failure of the buyer to fulfill its obligations (contractual 
payment) due to insolvency or bankruptcy. According to A Guide to Trade Credit Insurance 
(2015), political or country risk is “the risk that a government buyer or country prevents the 
fulfillment of a transaction or fails to meet payment obligations in time” (Guide to Trade 
Credit Insurance, 2015, p. 171). Short-term trade credit insurance typically covers both 
political and commercial risks. 
Van Dijk (2012) determines also fabrications risk, which means that the supplier is not 
able to deliver the goods and services due to circumstances of the buyer of these goods. 
A Guide to Trade Credit Insurance (2015) determines additionally conversion or transfer 
risk, which could be considered as a sort of political risk, also contract risk, post-shipment 
risk, pre-credit risk etc.  
According to EU experts (2012) trade credit insurance has its own characteristics, 
which distinguishes it from other classes of insurance. First, the claims tend to follow the 
business cycle. In general, this is typical for commercial risk claims. Second, the claims paid 
do not coincide with losses. In some periods claims could exceed the insurer’s recoveries. 
This is typical for political risk claims. Third, the costs of administration are higher than for 
D 
P 
Peq 
Qmax Qeq 
MC 
AC 
F 
G 
E H 
Quantity 
P
ri
ce
 
6 
most other types of insurance due to both labour intensive process and costs related to 
minimization of losses and recovery work (Study on short-term trade finance…, 2012, pp. 
5-7). 
A bulk of research determines three main alternatives to trade credit, which could be 
used for mitigating the credit risk. Table 1. summarizes benefit and disadvantages of trade 
credit insurance and its most common alternatives. 
Table no. 1. – Trade credit insurance and its main alternatives in the insurance market 
 Letter of credit Factoring Self-insurance Trade credit insurance 
C
h
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 
It is a bank’s 
agreement, which 
guarantees to the 
supplier the payment 
of a buyer’s 
obligation for the 
amount due with the 
specified terms and 
conditions.  
Only provides 
coverage for a single 
transaction with a 
single buyer 
The risk is beared by 
the bank, not the 
buyer 
Prefinancing 
the suppliers 
by financial 
institutions 
(factors), 
which pay a 
percentage of 
the face value 
of a trade 
receivable to 
the supplier.  
Creation of 
backward debt 
reserves aimed to 
cover losses 
occurred due to 
the default of 
receivable 
outstanding. As a 
an indicator firms 
could use the 
percentage of 
sales, past loss 
experience, 
percentage of 
overall 
receivables etc. 
Protection companies’ 
accounts receivable from 
losses occurred due to 
different risks 
A
d
v
a
n
ta
g
es
 
The payment is 
guaranteed by the 
bank.  
Giving security to 
both the supplier and 
the buyer. 
Reducing the 
production risk. 
The payment 
is guaranteed 
by factor 
Giving to a 
company an 
immediate 
access to cash  
 
Requiring the 
internal resources. 
Maintaining direct 
relationship with 
customers. 
Covering any type 
of loss 
Transfers of risks. 
Ensuring the sales growth and 
expansion into international 
markets. 
Receiving better financing 
terms. 
Reduction of backward debt 
reserves. 
Prevention suppliers from 
liquidity shortages or 
insolvency. 
Improving the borrowing 
power due to including the 
foreign receivables into the 
borrowing base. 
Providing an access to the 
insurer’s expertise. 
Providing the stability and 
reduction the volatility of 
earnings  
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D
is
a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
es
 
Expensiveness (fees 
and interest). 
Sensitivity to the 
foreign currency 
fluctuations. . 
Need to be cash 
secured (typical for 
developing markets). 
Increasing the 
transaction costs. 
Reduction the buyer’s 
borrowing capacity 
Lack of 
control. 
Aversion of 
some 
companies to 
deal with a 
“third-party” 
Expensiveness 
(two types of 
costs: a 
service charge 
– a percentage 
of sales 
factored, and 
an interest 
charge for the 
cash advance 
loan).  
Absence of fixed 
premium cost 
every month.  
No risk spreading.  
The absence of 
detailed statistics, 
generally 
provided by 
insurers.  
The insufficiency 
of accumulated 
funds in order to 
cover 
large and 
unexpected 
catastrophic 
losses 
Presence of specific 
coverage limits, other 
exclusions or limitations on 
coverage. 
Exclusion of foreign 
accounts from coverage 
(typically) 
Requiring the detailed 
periodic reports from the 
supplier. 
 
 
There are another tools for trade credit insurance such as alternative risk transfer 
(ART), which is mostly reserved for MNC and not for credit risks cash in advance (this is 
not a common method in international trade), bank guarantee, documentary collection. 
The main difference between letters of credit and trade credit insurance is the 
responsibility of the buyer, but not the supplier, who requests it from the bank. 
Approximately 70% of exported goods and services in America are traded through letters of 
credit. He argued that the company’s decision to choose whether factoring or trade credit 
insurance depends from desirable level of coverage and the size of the firm. Notably, large 
companies will not choose factoring, while the small companies will seek for factor’s 
services in order to do not dedicate their own resources to these functions. Also, when a 
company has a large number of low-value invoices and, respectively, the large number of 
clients the factoring could be an appropriate tool in order to mitigate the risks. At the same 
time the company with a small number of clients and high-value invoices will choose trade 
credit insurance as the cheapest tool (Riestra, 2003, pp. 12-13).  
Zurich American Insurance Corporation (2013) distinguishes four main types of trade 
credit insurance programs. They include the following. 
1. Whole-turnover policy under which the insured agent is required to cover its 
customers. Such policy, in turn, is divided into two types: excess-of-loss or non-cancellable 
underwriting philosophy (for large companies) and Ground Up or cancellable philosophy 
(for SMEs). 
2. Key Account Policy which is designed for economic agents who intend to insure 
only their key accounts.  
3. Single Buyer Policy, proposed for company, having disproportionate exposure unit 
comparing to the rest of its customers; 
4. Top Up Policy, under which the insured company uses a secondary carrier services 
in order to cover excess of limits of the primary buyer (Companies turning to Trade Credit 
Insurance, 2013, pp. 3-4). 
So, a trade credit insurance policy allows economic agents to be secured and to 
increase their sales on open account terms. It provides the competitive advantage to export 
traders, by ensuring the different trade credit insurance program, which can be adapted to 
certain conditions.  
Let’s briefly examine the history of trade credit insurance in the world.  
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The trade credit insurance practices appeared in the Mediterranean, after the 
Napoleonic wars in order to guarantee safety and payments in trade. The first insurers 
appeared in large ports such as Venice, Livorne, Naples and Gênes (Riestra, 2003, p. 14). 
But, according to Jones (2010) the first trade credit insurance techniques were established 
by the British Commercial Insurance Company in 1820 in order to provide both fire and life 
coverage (Jones, 2010, pp. 4-5). 
In the present form, the trade credit insurance established at the end of nineteenth 
century, and after it was developed in Western Europe between the World Wars (table 2). 
 
Table no. 2. – Countries, established trade guarantee and insurance schemes and programs 
Countries Period Rationale 
Switzerland  1906 To reduce unemployment and to 
stimulate the trade  
United Kingdom 1919 
1921 – First Guarantee 
Scheme  
1926 – Second Guarantee 
Scheme 
1930 – Credit Insurance 
Scheme. 
1933 – The Comprehensive 
Contract 
To reduce unemployment and to 
stimulate the trade 
To cover both political and commercial 
risks in trade 
Belgium 
Denmark 
the Netherlands 
Finland 
Germany 
Austria, Italy 
France and Spain 
Norway 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
To reestablish export trade 
To recover industries after the World 
War I  
To facilitate exports to the Soviet Union 
Japan 
Czechoslovakia, Latvia, 
Poland 
Sweden, Ireland 
1930 
1931 
1933 
1935 
To keep up trade flows after worldwide 
economic depression 
To maintain both output and employment 
the United States 1934 Export Import Bank 
started to offer different 
guarantees similar to trade 
credit insurance. 
1961 – Foreign Credit 
Insurance 
Association(FCIA)  
To reduce the political risks and partly 
the commercial risks. In 1964 the FCIA 
took the commercial risks entirely, 
reinsuring them at Export Import Bank 
Berne Union – 
International Union of 
Credit and Investment 
Insurers 
1934 To encourage cooperation among national 
trade credit insurers. 
To exchange information on clients and 
countries. 
To improve the level of competency in 
insurance techniques of member countries 
Mexico 1937 – Banco Mexicano de 
Comercio Exterior 
(BANCOMEXT) – the first 
trade credit insurer in a 
developing country 
To finance trade with North America and 
Europe  
Japan, Germany, Italy, 
Austria 
Late 1940s – early 1950s To restore exports  
To assist in reconstruction after the World 
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War II 
South Africa  1956 – the first African 
trade credit insurance 
program 
To finance trade with Europe and Asia 
Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Korea, Pakistan, 
Peru, Portugal 
1960s To extend business activity and to 
increase employment 
To improve international competitiveness 
To increase exports flows 
To strengthen the balance of payments 
and the dynamic export growth industries 
Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Uruguay, Venezuela 
1970s 
Egypt, Indonesia, 
Tunisia, Turkey 
1980s 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and other countries 
1990s 
Source: (Jones, 2010; Krauss, 2011; Riestra, 2003; van Dijk, 2012) 
 
At present the trade credit insurance remains a specific area of non-life insurance. 
During the 1990s, three groups – Autraduis, Coface and Euler Hermes accounted for over 
85% of the global credit insurance market, i.e. this market is highly concentrated (Jones, 
2010, p. 4). 
In early 2000s, in Europe, trade credit insurance activity represented on average only 
1% of non-life premiums. This indicator differed by country. For example, UK with high 
penetration rate for non-life insurance, had a relatively low credit insurance indicators, while 
Spain, having average rates of non-life credit insurance, ranked at the top for trade credit 
insurance. Due to EU regulations related to the privatization of short-term trade credit 
insurance, the premiums were increased substantially (Riestra, 2003, pp. 14-15). 
The U.S. is now regarded as developing market for trade credit insurance products, 
since historically insured preferred other types of trade risks insurance, such as letter of 
credit. But the increased risks in cross-border transactions lead to the increase of the demand 
of trade credit insurance. So, the trade credit insurance is a new concept for the U.S. 
insurance market, notably in non-life insurance area. Now Eximbank plays a crucial role in 
this market, by proving coverage to small business and to companies dealing with higher 
risk countries (Companies turning to Trade Credit Insurance…, 2013, p. 2).  
IV. Empirical analysis 
Let’s analyze the situation with claims and recoveries in the countries worldwide. For 
that we used data provided by Berne Union for the period 2005-2015.  
Fig. 2. presents the dynamics of claims paid and recoveries for the short term trade 
credit insurance. 
10 
 
Source: (Berne Union Statistics. 2008-2013; Berne Union Statistics. 2011-2015; Berne 
Union Yearbook 2009) 
Figure no. 2. Dynamics of claims and recoveries for short-term trade credits for 2005-
2015 
 
It can be observed that every year, except 2006, the claims paid exceeded recoveries. 
From 2005 to 2009 and from 2011 to 2015 claims paid for short term export credit 
transactions have been gradually increased, reflecting mainly the growing business volumes. 
This indicator returned to its normal value in 2010 and 2011 after peak in 2009. One of the 
main reasons of such unusual increase of claims paid was the Arab Spring.  
According to Berne Union (2016), the highest volumes of claims paid for the short 
term export credit insurance per country in 2015 resulted from defaults in Russia ($236 
million), Brazil ($205 million), Venezuela ($202 million), USA ($161 million), and Saudi 
Arabia ($150 million). It should be noted that many export credit agencies in the world have 
been affected by losses in Ukraine.  
The peak of recoveries was reached in 2006; they were made from Algeria and Russia. 
Despite that in 2009 the claims paid were more than doubled the recoveries remained 
unchanged. 
The next step is to analyze the dynamics of claims and recoveries for medium and long 
term trade credit insurance. For the analysis we divide the mentioned indicators for those 
related to the commercial risk (Fig. 3) and to the political risk (Fig. 4) respectively. 
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Source: (Berne Union Statistics. 2008-2013; Berne Union Statistics. 2011-2015; Berne 
Union Yearbook 2009) 
Figure no. 3. Dynamics of claims and recoveries related to the commercial risk for 
medium and long trade credits for 2005-2015 
 
During the start of world financial crisis in 2008 one could observe the prevailing of 
commercial claims, related to liquidity shortages. But in 2009 the situation has been 
changed focusing on the political risk. In 2011-2011 the balance between commercial and 
political claims was disrupted due to situation in Iran and North Africa, notably in Libya. 
The following increase of commercial claims relatively to political ones in 2010-2014 
occurred due to economic deterioration of debtors, growth of privatization in emerging 
markets and to a devaluation of certain currencies. But in 2015 political claims occupied 
54,3% of claims paid for the medium and long term trade credit insurance while the share of 
commercial claims was 45,7%.  
According to Berne Union (2014), one of the most important reasons of dominance the 
commercial claims on political ones during the last 15 years was the transformation 
processes in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Hans Janus, Member of the Board at Euler 
Hermes Deutschland Aktiengesellschaft, stated that “Political risk lost its dominance for 
credit insurers and in particular the currency conversion and transfer risks disappeared 
entirely as a consequence of the abolition of currency controls in most of the countries” (A 
history of the Berne Union, 2014). 
It could be observed that in 2005-2008 MLT claims paid have been gradually 
decreased. The peak of MLT recoveries in 2005-2006 occurred due to large amounts 
recovered from Algeria, Nigeria and Russia. In 2009-2012 both MLT trade credit and 
political risk insurance claims have been increased due to deterioration of macroeconomic 
situation in many countries. This had a special impact on commercial claims.  
Berne Union (2016) considers that the highest amounts of claims paid for the medium 
and long term trade credit insurance per country in 2015 were due to defaults in Russia 
(1,448 million, Iran ($374 million), USA ($301 million), Brazil ($192 million) and Ukraine 
($168 million). 
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Source: (Berne Union Statistics. 2008-2013; Berne Union Statistics. 2011-2015; Berne 
Union Yearbook 2009) 
Figure no. 4. Dynamics of claims and recoveries related to the political risk for 
medium and long trade credits for 2005-2015 
 
It should be noted that the situation differs from country to country. For example, 
debtors in Iran faced difficulties to effect payments abroad due to sanctions. In Russia 
claims paid were affected by low prices for energy and mining resources. The number of 
claims in Ukraine is directly related to the geopolitical conflict and weakness, as a result, of 
national economy.  
V. Conclusion and further discussion 
We briefly consider some conceptual issues concerning the trade credit insurance in 
the world. The provided analysis allowed us to determine that in now in international trade 
relations is rather difficult to operate without possibility of spreading the risk in order to 
offset partially the impact of losses. We also determine the main instruments of mitigating 
risks in international trade, their benefits and drawbacks. The expensiveness and transaction 
costs are the essential disadvantages of alternatives of trade credit insurance. Transactions in 
the insurance market are often affected by asymmetric information, which in turn lead to 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. We define that the essential reasons of 
introduction the trade credit insurance schemes in countries worldwide are re-establishing 
and developing the export trade, especially after geopolitical conflicts, improving the 
international competitiveness, strengthening the balance of payments.  
Using both comparative and graphical analysis we provide an evaluation of dynamics 
of claims and recoveries for short-term and long and medium term trade credit insurance in 
the world. Let’s briefly examine the implication of these findings in terms of information 
asymmetry in the trade credit insurance. We found that over the last years the claims paid on 
short-term trade credit insurance exceed the appropriate recoveries and that trend holds. This 
is mostly related to the growing business volumes. The claims related to the commercial risk 
for medium and long trade credits in recent years exceed the recoveries, while with the 
political risk the reverse trend holds.  
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Said otherwise, for the commercial risk the claims/recoveries ratio exceeds 1, and 
conversely for the political risk. In terms of information asymmetry, this situation can be 
graphically represented as in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Source: Author 
Figure no. 5. Commercial and political risk in trade credit insurance 
 
Under commercial risk there are prerequisites both for the adverse selection and moral 
hazard since insureds are more informed about the risks of transaction. I.e. these risks are 
mostly endogenous. The insured could control his own behavior and (to a certain extent) the 
behavior of his counterpart and to provide the insurer an incomplete information in order to 
obtain an unfair benefit. In contrast, under political risk the insured could not manipulate the 
information since the risks are mostly exogenous. 
The presence of information asymmetry leads to the appropriate behavioral decisions 
on the part of both insurers and insureds. But the reasons of different values of 
claims/recoveries ratios for both types of risk vary, notably: 
for commercial risk – the incomplete information and the relatively high level of 
control of commercial transactions can be a reason for the manipulations leading to the 
moral hazard possibly reflected in the excess of claims over recoveries; 
for political risk – the difficulties of estimation complicate the controllability of 
transaction on the part of both insurers and insureds since the impact of exogenous factors is 
very strong; the law of large numbers does not hold – in contrast with the commercial risk. 
The direction of future research will be related to the quantitative estimation of claims 
and recoveries, notably the dispersion of their values differentiated by type of risk in order 
to examine the degree of awareness of an insurer about possible level of risk. 
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